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ABSTRACTS
Der einleitende Beitrag umreißt einen Rahmen, der die Dynamik der eurasischen Landmasse 
(flexibel definiert) in den Mittelpunkt der Weltgeschichte der letzten drei Jahrtausende stellt. 
Konzepte von Kulturraum, Zivilisation und Weltsystem werden kritisch überprüft. Besonderes 
Augenmerk gilt den Theorien der Achsenzeit, die sowohl religiöse als auch säkulare Varianten 
der Transzendenz umfassen, sowie deren Rolle bei der Legitimation politischer Institutionen. 
Diese Ansätze werden durch den Rückgriff auf den anthropo-archäologischen Materialismus 
von Jack Goody ergänzt, der die „alternierende Führung“ zwischen Ost und West betont. Der 
Fokus von Goody auf die wachsende städtische Differenzierung in den agrarischen Reichen der 
Bronzezeit kann erweitert werden, indem das Spektrum der Zivilisationen über die der intensi-
ven Landwirtschaft hinaus ausgedehnt wird. Dieser Ansatz lässt sich mit theoretischen Erkennt-
nissen von Karl Polanyi gewinnbringend kombinieren, um eine neue historische ökonomische 
Anthropologie anzuregen, die es uns ermöglicht, verschiedene Varianten des Sozialismus auf 
die Formen der sozialen Inklusion und der „imperialen sozialen Verantwortung“ zurückzufüh-
ren, die in der Achsenzeit entstanden sind. Der Aufsatz argumentiert weiterhin, dass die eu-
rasischen Zivilisationen, die die „große Dialektik“ zwischen Umverteilung und Marktaustausch 
hervorgebracht haben, angesichts der Widersprüche der heutigen neoliberalen politischen 
Ökonomie die beste Hoffnung sind, um die Spannungen des Kapitalozäns (angemessener 
wäre „Eurasiazän“) aufzulösen. 
This introductory paper outlines a frame that places the dynamics of the Eurasian landmass 
(flexibly defined) at the centre of world history in the last three millennia. Concepts of culture 
area, civilization and world system are critically reviewed. Particular attention is paid to Axial 
Age theories, including both religious and secular variants of transcendence, and their role in 
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the legitimation of political institutions. These approaches are supplemented with recourse to 
the anthropo-archaeological materialism of Jack Goody, who emphasizes “alternating leader-
ship” between East and West. Goody’s focus on increasing urban differentiation in the agrarian 
empires of the Bronze Age can be expanded by widening the range of civilizations considered 
beyond those based on intensive agriculture. This approach can be fruitfully combined with 
theoretical insights of Karl Polanyi to inspire a new historical economic anthropology that al-
lows us to trace multiple varieties of socialism back to the forms of social inclusion and “impe-
rial social responsibility” that emerged in the Axial Age. It is further argued that, in the light of 
the contradictions of contemporary neoliberal political economy, the Eurasian civilizations that 
launched the “great dialectic” between redistribution and market exchange are the best hope 
we have for resolving the tensions of the Capitalocene (which might be more appropriately 
termed Eurasiacene). 
The papers gathered in this Special Issue illuminate multiple facets of the history of 
Eurasia and the world in the last three millennia.1 While any starting point is in a sense 
arbitrary, for the purposes of theorizing Eurasia the most pertinent body of literature is 
that which has become known as Axial Age theory, which continues to generate debate.2 
Its most influential exponent was the German philosopher Karl Jaspers in the years im-
mediately following the Second World War.3 Jaspers’ identification of an “axial” transfor-
mation in five distinct locations between the eastern Mediterranean and China across the 
Eurasian landmass in the five centuries between 800 BCE and 300 BCE was by no mean 
altogether without precedent in European historical narratives. If one strand in Enlight-
enment thought was to emphasize universal reason, with its apotheosis in Paris, another 
strand, with its primary intellectual centres in the German-speaking world, emphasized 
the plurality of human cultures and the unique value of each one of them. Further dis-
tinctions were drawn as various scholars pluralized the notion of civilization, while re-
stricting its use to a limited set of “high cultures”. Anquetil-Duperron seems to have been 
the first to notice the coincidence of striking innovations in human cosmologies in the 
middle of the first millennium BCE.4 Numerous scholars pursued this line of enquiry in 
the course of the nineteenth century. The formulation of a “moral revolution” by Scottish 
1 This paper derives from research supported by the European Research Council (Realising Eurasia: Civilisation 
and Moral Economy in the 21st Century, project no: 340854). The present attempt to deepen the historical 
framing of that project has been shaped by discussions at two meetings. The first was the panel “Empires, 
exchange and civilizational connectivity in Eurasia” at the Fifth European Congress on World and Global History 
(Budapest, 31 August – 3 September 2017). The second was a Workshop titled “Re-examining the idea of the 
Axial Age and Axial Civilizations”, 5th–7th April 2018 at the Swedish Collegium of Advanced Study at Uppsala. I am 
indebted to many participants at both of these meetings. 
2 Johann P. Arnason, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, and Björn Wittrock (eds.), Axial Civilizations and World History, Leiden 
2005; Robert N. Bellah and Hans Joas, The Axial Age and Its Consequences, Cambridge, MA 2012; Robert N. 
Bellah, Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age, Cambridge, MA 2011.
3 Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, translated by Michael Bullock, first published in 1949, Abingdon, UK 
2010.
4 Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron, Zend-Avesta, ouvrage de Zoroastre: contenant les idées théologiques, 
physiques & morales de ce législateur, Vol. 1, Paris 1771. See also John Torpey, The Three Axial Ages: Moral, Ma-
terial, Mental, New Brunswick, NJ 2017.
16 | Chris Hann
folklorist John Stuart-Glennie is one intervention that has become prominent in recent 
research. According to these arguments, new notions of transcendence (not necessarily in 
the form of a monotheistic God) initiated forms of normative regulation that promoted 
the solidarity of the community. While the contributions to Axial Age theorizing differ 
considerably, most can be understood as responses to the world domination of Western 
Eurasian powers, and then, more specifically, to the catastrophes which engulfed them 
in the twentieth century. Jaspers’ formulations following the Second World War were a 
reaction to that cataclysm, comparable to that of Max Scheler following the First World 
War.5 
Some aspects of axiality theorizing seem too vague to be tested. Some have suggested 
that the concept of Axial Age can be pluralized, for example by identifying the onset 
of industrialization or our ongoing digital revolution as equivalent moments of rup-
ture.6 But this would hardly be compatible with the main thesis of Jaspers, which asserts 
a momentous shift in the capacity of human cognition, involving reflexivity, criticism 
and individuality, that cannot be matched by any later transformations. Jaspers was a 
German idealist philosopher, in a lineage established by Kant and Hegel. His vision is 
one that downplays the distinctive features of the five cases treated, as well as possible 
links between them. When its propositions are formulated as testable propositions, e.g. 
concerning the prevalence of new moralizing norms backed up by formal legal codes, 
the locations and centuries identified by Jaspers receive no clear confirmation in the 
historical-archaeological record.7
A second key field of ongoing debate is the connection between the new modes of 
thought and politics, more specifically the organization and legitimation of states larger 
in scale and more complex than any previous polities. No consensus has emerged con-
cerning the links between empire and cosmology. Johann Arnason, one of the most 
influential contributors to the debates in recent decades, has concluded that it is impos-
sible to identify any general pattern. The contrasts between the city states of Greece and 
the embryonic unity of China are so great that no concept of empire can be stretched to 
cover both; they require separate, singular narratives.8 In any case, conceptions of empire 
changed radically towards the end of the Axial Age, in the wake of Alexander the Great, 
as Krishan Kumar demonstrates in this issue. In later centuries, both land-based and 
maritime empires enabled the dissemination of goods and ideas and the trans-Eurasian 
mobility of their human carriers. 
5 Max Scheler, Krieg und Aufbau, Leipzig 1916. Jan Assmann is currently writing a comprehensive account of 
these contributions and my discussion draws on his presentation at the Uppsala Workshop (see note 1). 
6 Torpey, The Three Axial Ages.
7 Daniel A. Mullins et al, A Systematic Assessment of ‘Axial Age’ Proposals Using Global Comparative Historical 
Evidence, in: American Sociological Review 83 (2018) 3: 596-626.
8 Johann P. Arnason, Rehistoricizing the Axial Age, in: The Axial Age and Its Consequences, eds. Robert N. Bellah 
and Hans Joas, Cambridge, MA 2012, pp. 337-65. While he does not consider axiality to be a “meaningful con-
cept“, Arnason retains “Axial Age“ as an “Epochenbegriff“. In his view, “redefinitions of the link between politics 
and religion“ reveal a “common problematic behind the different patterns“ found in the civilizations originally 
identified by Jaspers (Arnason, personal communication).
Eurasian Dynamics: From Agrarian Axiality to the Connectivities of the Capitalocene | 17
At this point it is important to clarify my understanding of Eurasia. Contrary to a sub-
stantial Russian historiography that privileges the role of the Russian nation in the forg-
ing of a vast intercontinental space, and certain Euro-American approaches which rep-
licate this focus on an interface between Europe and Asia, the definition adopted here 
is one that rejects the a priori existence of Europe and Asia as distinct continents.9 This 
construction, which derives ultimately from the ancient Greeks, has no civilizational jus-
tification. The Eurasia which concerns us is not confined to the landmass conventionally 
described as Europe and Asia but includes the southern shores of the Mediterranean. At 
the same time, the historical model of Eurasia as “Old World”, based on the agrarian em-
pires of temperate geographical zones, with their epicentre in Mesopotamia, is clearly not 
congruent with the entire territory of the world’s largest landmass. In the long history of 
intensifying connectivity, some regions were more involved than others. The civilizations 
of the steppe were of great importance, as Marie Favereau demonstrates in this issue. 
Vast expenses of ice and tundra were hardly incorporated in substantive ways until recent 
generations. Like the enclaves of “tribal” society that persisted in the heart of many agrar-
ian empires, such regions formed “remote” parts of the Eurasian dynamic. But this kind 
of complexity does not invalidate generalizing about “Eurasian history” any more than 
the persistence of Sami nomadic cultures invalidates generalizations about the history 
of Europe. Conventional emphasis on the agrarian empires implies a concentration on 
the terrestrial, and on arteries of communication such as the original Silk Routes. This is 
clearly insufficient. Just as we need to look north of the agrarian empires to understand 
the contribution of the polities of the steppe, so we need also to look south and engage 
with the Indian Ocean World in order to grasp maritime connectivities. This is the sub-
ject of Burkhard Schnepel’s contribution to this issue. Our conception of Eurasia must 
be flexible enough to include the Swahili coast of Africa as well as the southern shores of 
the Mediterranean.10 
Approaches to Macro-History
The concept of Eurasia is a challenge to powerful narratives in history and the social 
sciences that oppose a stagnant Orient to a dynamic Occident and, more fundamen-
tally, tradition to modernity. It is not just the notion of “continent” that needs to be 
questioned. Concepts such as “society” and “culture” are also problematic to the extent 
that they reflect the prominence of the nation-state as a hegemonic form of polity in 
our era.11 Many attempts have been made to correct the distortions that arise from these 
blinkers, in order to move global history to a more truly universal level.
   9 Chris Hann, A Concept of Eurasia, in: Current Anthropology 57 (2016) 1: 1-27.
10 This point was emphasized at the Budapest panel by Dagmar Schäfer.
11 Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Mi-
gration and the Social Sciences, in: Global Networks 2 (2002) 4: 301-334.
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The concept of culture area constitutes a significant contribution from socio-cultural 
anthropology. It can be traced back to the German-speaking countries before the First 
World War under the name Kulturgeschichte.12 Ethnologists, as they came to be known 
at the time, often based in museums where they were confronted with artefacts of di-
verse provenance, worked out rigorous methods for reconstructing the likely paths of 
their diffusion. Some emphasized the constraints set by the material environment, others 
were more interested in kinship and domestic organization, others again in rituals and 
cosmological beliefs. Eventually, following the so-called “fieldwork revolution”, a great 
deal of twentieth-century anthropology was devoted to the investigation of how all of 
these fitted together to form holistic localized societies. Meanwhile to grasp larger scales 
the concept of culture area was developed in North America. It was associated with the 
quantitative analyses enabled by the “Human Relations Area Files,” developed by George 
Peter Murdock.13 This database has been continuously refined but, in a discipline that is 
nowadays primarily oriented to the gathering of new ethnographic data, it has acquired 
a largely historical (even antiquarian) character. It might be supposed that the accelerated 
flows of globalization would revive interest in diffusionist methods and the potential for 
identifying culture areas in the twenty-first century; but this does not seem to be hap-
pening. In Eurasia as elsewhere, the older ethnological approaches are more useful to 
archaeologists engaging with prehistory than to global historians. In anthropology, the 
concept of culture area has been largely relegated to disciplinary history. 
The concept of civilization warrants more careful inspection. Definitional uncertainty 
and normative associations have dogged this term since it was coined in the eighteenth 
century.14 Despite these confusions, a plural, non-normative concept of civilisation was 
productively developed by Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss in the first decades of 
the twentieth century.15 This drew on their familiarity with contemporary work in Ger-
man ethnology, but it was intended to capture much more than the museological traits 
which dominated Kulturgeschichte. A civilisation was a “family of societies” and non-
literate aboriginal Australia furnished excellent illustrations. Civilization was a macro-
level complement to society, the master concept of Durkheimian sociology. In this sense, 
it was potentially applicable to all human societies in time and space. However, although 
Mauss returned to the theme after his uncle’s death, his later writings on the subject 
remained fragmentary. As Johann Arnason has shown, the civilizational dimension has 
been of considerable importance in French anthropology down to the present day, even 
if the word itself is seldom employed. But it has been explored selectively in regions such 
12 The best known variant of German diffusionist theory is the Kulturkreislehre of the Vienna School of Pater Wil-
helm Schmidt. See Andre Gingrich, The German-speaking Countries, pp. 59-15 in One Discipline, Four Ways: 
British, German, French, and American Anthropology, Fredrik Barth et al., Chicago 2005.
13 George P. Murdock, Ethnographic Atlas, Pittsburgh, PA 1967.
14 Johann P. Arnason, Civilizations in Dispute: Historical Questions and Theoretical Conditions, Leiden 2003.
15 See Nathan Schlanger (ed.), Techniques, Technology and Civilization. Marcel Mauss, New York 2006.
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as Amazonia, remote from the prime locations of recent planetary transformations in 
Eurasia.16 
In contrast to the analysis of culture areas, civilizational analysis has been a more inter-
disciplinary enterprise. When it comes to Eurasia, the work of historians has been com-
plemented by sociologists and many others. Not all embraced the term civilization and 
those who did, most famously Braudel, often did so loosely and ambiguously.17 Working 
in a Weberian tradition, Shmuel Eisenstadt theorized agrarian empires as an ideal-type 
and later supplemented this political sociology with an engagement with Axial Age ide-
as.18 By the end of the twentieth century the concept of civilization had been taken up by 
other, more powerful voices. The most influential was that of political scientist Samuel 
Huntington, who soon after the end of the Cold War proclaimed that the old East-West 
rift was now being replaced by a “clash of civilizations.”19 This usage was diametrically 
opposed to that of Arnason, and behind him of Mauss, Durkheim and many others, for 
whom civilizations are never the closed, essentialized entities projected by Huntington. 
Whether or not the term civilization is considered to be too contaminated by its Enlight-
enment origins and its associations in the contemporary public sphere to be deployed 
analytically in historical analysis, it does raise other problems. From the point of view 
of political economy, it is open to the same principled objection as the idealist notion 
of Axial Age: to focus on civilization is to neglect the realities of material existence. The 
most influential attempt to identify larger units of analysis in order to transcend par-
ticularist (cultural) boundaries, irrespective of their level (societal or civilizational), is 
the world-system approach of Immanuel Wallerstein.20 Wallerstein has devoted most of 
his career to analysing the “modern world-system” of capitalist accumulation since the 
sixteenth century. He insists, however, that his method can be adapted for the study of 
earlier periods. The terminology is confusing because not even the modern world-system 
embraces the entire world (though this is nowadays belatedly coming about in the course 
of accelerating globalization). Rather, “world-system” refers to a complex constellation of 
“world-economy” and “world-empire” in which the “world” is the signifier of connectiv-
ity. According to Wallerstein, the modern world-system is characterized by the endless 
accumulation of capital. This has been made possible by an interstate system in which 
particular polities (Great Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States in the 
twentieth) exercise hegemony, but not as a “world-empire” in the manner that, for exam-
ple, the Romans (discussed in this issue by Kumar) or the Chinese dynasties (discussed 
16 Johann P. Arnason, Mauss Revisited: The Birth of Civilizational Analysis from the Spirit of Anthropology, in: Civi-
lizational Analysis and Anthropology. Eurasian Explorations, eds. Johann P. Arnason and Chris Hann, Albany, NY 
2018, pp. 1-33.
17 Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th century, 3 vols., Berkeley 1982–84. See also Braudel, A 
History of Civilizations, New York 1993.
18 Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires, New York 1963; Idem, Axial Age Civilization and the Axial 
Age Reconsidered, in: Axial Civilizations and World History, eds. Johann P. Arnason et al., Leiden 2005, pp. 531-64; 
see also Sheldon Pollock, Axialism and Empire, ibid., pp. 397-450.
19 S.P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York 1996.
20 For a mature outline, see Immanuel Wallerstein, World-systems Analysis. An Introduction, Durham, NC. 2004.
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by Goldstone) formed world-empires. World-empires are a threat to the logic of capital 
accumulation because they are liable to disturb the norms of the world-economy. 
From this perspective, the most exciting question in the geopolitical debates of our era is 
whether the ancient civilization of China is currently morphing not simply into the new 
dominant player in the interstate system but into a world-empire capable of changing 
the rules of the game at the planetary level. In any case, the recent rise of the People’s 
Republic poses a challenge to the caesura that has dominated the work of Immanuel 
Wallerstein. He acknowledges that key diagnostic features of commodity economy (in-
cluding money, credit and wage-labour) were present in East Asia in ancient times, but 
distinguishes these earlier forms from fully-fledged capitalism. Following Braudel, he 
maintains that capitalist modernity began only in the age when the far West of the land-
mass entered the most dynamic period in its history. But if we remove the ubiquitous 
hyphens from the conceptual apparatus provided by Wallerstein and aim instead, in 
the spirit of a universal history, to explain planetary transformation, then the case for 
privileging Western Eurasia is by no means obvious. It is necessary to acknowledge the 
technologies of production and communication developed in the course of inter-civili-
zational encounters across and at the edges of the landmass over a much longer period. 
The Materialist, Anthropo-archaeological Approach of Jack Goody
The social anthropologist Jack Goody arrived at a concept of Eurasia by a distinctive 
route that privileged neither ideas and moralities in the manner of the Axial Age theo-
rists, nor political economy in the manner of the Marxists. Goody analysed production 
and consumption in the context of a comprehensive vision of technologies of commu-
nication and evolving social relations, with particular attention to domestic organiza-
tion and the intergenerational transmission of property. From his perspective, the clas-
sical philosophical texts of the Axial Age are explicable by the development of literacy 
(however restricted), rather than some prior tectonic shift in human mental and moral 
capacities. For Goody, while human social relations are continuously in flux, certain 
key elements of cognition are universal to our species. Changes in this domain are for 
investigation by evolutionary biologists rather than historians or social scientists. Com-
pared to the proponents of axiality, Jack Goody is therefore a gradualist. He is sceptical 
of terms such as modernity and capitalism, and never embraced any of the conceptual 
frameworks discussed in the previous section. 
Goody spent the first decades of his academic career as an Africanist, working in small, 
non-literate, non-centralized communities in what is now northern Ghana.21 From 
here, forms of production, consumption, kinship organization and social stratification 
in agrarian societies across Eurasia looked very similar, in comparison with the simpler, 
21 For an introduction to the work and life of Goody, see Chris Hann, John Rankine Goody, 1919–2015, in: Biogra-
phical Memoirs of Fellows of the British Academy XVI (2017): 457-81.
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more egalitarian forms of sub-Saharan Africa. In Africa, for example, marital payments 
generally took the form of “horizontal” transfers between kin groups rather than “verti-
cal” transfers to endow the new couple, the paradigmatic form across Eurasia. Bride-
wealth consisted in the circulation of valuables between groups that were more or less 
equal in status, whereas dowry constituted a form of pre-mortem inheritance in signifi-
cantly more differentiated societies. The position of women, notably their role in systems 
of production and property, reflected this structural difference.22
Goody traced these differences back to technologies of production. Both Eurasia and 
Africa had experienced the Neolithic, but only in Eurasia had intensive forms of agri-
culture based on the plough produced the surpluses necessary for new forms of urban 
life to emerge and flourish. In stressing the urban revolution of the Bronze Age, Goody 
was following archaeologist Gordon Childe (whose Marxist version of prehistory he had 
first read in a German prisoner of war camp). This chronology posits the era of deci-
sive change well before the centuries identified by Jaspers and other Axial Age theorists. 
Goody was unswervingly loyal to the Childean account, which he saw as free of the 
Eurocentric bias of the many social theorists and historians he criticised in his own late 
work. Goody’s last major book was a return to materialist first principles in which he 
explored the significance of “the search for metals” and the techniques of their mining 
and processing for the larger story of the emergence of “capitalism”, from prehistory to 
the industrial era.23 
Apart from his pioneering contributions to the study of kinship and domestic organiza-
tion, Goody augmented Childe’s materialism in two further ways. First, he paid more 
attention to commerce and consumption. Without denying parallel invention in differ-
ent Eurasian locations where similar material transformations were under way, he em-
phasizes the role of commercial relations (“merchant cultures”) for the transmission of 
knowledge, over and above the exchange of specific goods and technologies. The demand 
to consume and display luxury goods is associated with “connoisseurship” on the part of 
urban elites, which Goody views as an embryonic form of bourgeois social emulation. 
Following a pioneering investigation of the relationship between haute cuisine and social 
class in Eurasia, his definitive demonstration of these forms of distinction was a massive 
study of flowers.24 
A second field in which Jack Goody significantly embellished the archaeological ac-
counts concerned technologies of communication, above all literacy. This was a salient 
theme in his oeuvre from early days, when he realised how rapidly changes could take 
22 Jack Goody, The Oriental, the Ancient and the Primitive: Systems of Marriage and the Family in the Pre-industrial 
Societies of Eurasia, Cambridge 1990.
23 Jack Goody, Metals, Culture and Capitalism: An Essay on the Origins of the Modern World, Cambridge 2012. 
Others have been more critical of Childe in this regard: see David Wengrow, Comment to Hann’s article: The 
Concept of Eurasia, in: Current Anthropology 57 (2016) 1: 20. See also Maxime N. Brami, The Invention of 
Prehistory and the Rediscovery of Europe: Exploring the Deeper Intellectual Roots of Gordon Childe’s Neolithic 
‘Revolution’ (1936), in: Journal of World Prehistory (forthcoming).
24 Jack Goody, Cooking, Cuisine and Class: A Study in Comparative Sociology, Cambridge 1982; The Culture of 
Flowers, Cambridge 1993.
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place in the orally transmitted myths of the LoDagaa in Northern Ghana. Writing cre-
ated the possibility to advance knowledge more systematically, including science and 
technology. In early formulations Goody thought that alphabetic scripts, notably that 
of the Greeks, heralded the breakthrough. Later he conceded that logographic repre-
sentations, as in East Asia, could have the same implications for the organization of 
society and the development of science.25 He revisited the theme of literacy throughout 
his career, consistently opposing the hypothesis of Claude Lévi-Strauss, who contrasted 
“savage thought” to the thought of modern humans. Alongside differences in technology 
and the devolution of property, new technologies of communication were central to his 
account of the emergence of more complex and differentiated forms of society. But hu-
man beings themselves did not become new creatures in the relatively short time span of 
these developments. The capacities for “moralizing punishment” and “universal” abstrac-
tion celebrated by the Axial Age theorists are present in oral cultures (not merely latent); 
they are susceptible to intensification when new possibilities arise to store knowledge in 
textual forms, but the changes are gradual and hardly “axial”.
Historical Economic Anthropology:  
From Imperial Social Responsibility to Socialism
In this section, following a critical assessment of Goody’s own critique, I move to a 
synthesis with the help of a very different thinker. Goody’s work on metals and on the 
merchant cultures of the Indian Ocean world as well as the terrestrial routes is consist-
ent with that of scholars such as Johann Arnason, who emphasize inter-civilizational 
encounters.26 He is right to place considerable weight on connectivity, and to remind 
Western readers that the main features of contractual social relations, “rational” entre-
preneurship (including credit and double-entry accounting) were all present in East Asia 
before the Common Era. They were not “inventions” of the West, any more than notions 
of democracy, civil society and the Rechtsstaat are the unique prerogative of Western 
Eurasia. Goody is also right to note that clerical literati could, in certain times and places, 
promote education and critical attitudes to existing knowledge, while at other times their 
influence was conservative and even repressive. In general, however, he downplays the 
significance of ideational (or ideological) factors. 
Goody may go too far when he asserts that religious ideas played no significant role in 
themselves, or that they were less important in promoting Eurasian connectivity than the 
decentralized activities of merchants.27 He shies away not only from religion but from 
a consideration of politics in the broadest sense. Traders did not operate in a political 
vacuum. Whether in relatively small city-states or large-scale imperial formations, they 
25 Jack Goody, The Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society, Cambridge 1986.
26 Goody does not use the vocabulary of civilizational analysis.
27 This tendency is conspicuous in a late short synthesis: Jack Goody, The Eurasian Miracle, Cambridge 2010.
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were always constrained by secular power holders (as Favereau and Bellér-Hann demon-
strate in this issue). Changes in the legitimation of power, in the relations between secu-
lar and religious officials where these have become differentiated, and in the cosmologies 
linking both to the wider society, must all be taken into account. One way to open up 
a more comprehensive approach is to return to the holistic economic anthropology of 
the polymath Karl Polanyi.28 In the “substantivist” approach that he elaborated in the 
1950s, Polanyi argued that the study of economy must embed the phenomena of pro-
duction, distribution and exchange in wider societal contexts. Formalist theories in terms 
of choice-making to maximise profit or utility were rejected in favour of approaches that 
paid close attention to history. Polanyi himself never worked out a coherent philosophy 
of history, and he certainly did not work with a concept of Eurasia. What he offers is a 
general theory of economy that combines material and moral-ethical aspects, and a basic 
tool-kit for analysis. The central tools are ideal types which he variously called “principles 
of economic behaviour” and “forms of integration.” These are combined in different 
ways in different social formations. The three types that he retained in his mature work 
(having dropped the category of “householding”) were reciprocity, redistribution and 
(market) exchange.29
For my purposes here, the most interesting types are redistribution and market exchange. 
Redistribution is characterized by Polanyi as the flow of resources into a centre and their 
reallocation. His illustrations are taken from historical and ethnographic sources. They 
include the tribal chief who gathers valued objects together before distributing them to 
the community (sometimes destroying some or even all of them in the course of elabo-
rate rituals). Redistribution, then, is nothing new in human history. Polanyi eschews 
evolutionist theory, but there is nonetheless a clear sense in which, in technologically 
simple societies lacking a political centre, the main form of integration is reciprocity. 
Redistribution is a principle that emerges later but retains its prominence, even in com-
plex industrial societies, as a counter to the principle of market exchange. Polanyi’s major 
work investigated the catastrophic consequences of the “disembedding” of the economy 
from social contexts in the laissez-faire “market society” of Britain in the nineteenth 
century.30 He was a committed socialist (albeit an unorthodox one), who believed to the 
end of his life (Polanyi died in 1964 in Canada) that redistribution in the form of central 
planning, as practised by the Soviet Union and its allies, including his native Hungary, 
was the only conceivable way to redeem the world from the iniquities of capitalist class 
society. Polanyi never embraced historical materialism or any other theory that smacked 
of economic determinism. But he recognized the affinity between the new secular princi-
28 The synthesis advanced here draws on Chris Hann, Long Live Eurasian Civ. Towards a New Confluence of An-
thropology and World History, in: Zeitschrift für Ethnologie 142 (2017) 2: 225-44.
29 Karl Polanyi, The Economy as Instituted Process, in: Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economies in History 
and Theory, eds. Karl Polanyi et al., Glencoe, IL 1957, 243-70.
30 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of our Time, New York 1944.
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ples of socialism, enunciated by the prophet Karl Marx, and the earlier doctrines of Jesus 
Christ, the prophet of Christianity.31 
From the perspective of Polanyi, the market society of the nineteenth century was an 
unprecedented distortion of the long-term dialectic between redistribution and market 
economy. On this occasion the “double movement,” whereby society responded to the 
utopian illusion of the “self-regulating market,” led ineluctably to Fascism and the ca-
tastrophes of the first half of the twentieth century. It is sometimes argued that Polanyi’s 
call for a “great transformation” was answered shortly after the publication of his opus 
magnum with the post-war settlement and the consolidation of welfare states throughout 
Western Europe during the next thirty years. Closer inspection of his writings suggests 
that his socialism was more radical. Redistribution in the guise of socialism was the 
dominant form of integration across Eurasia in the last decades of his life, when drastic 
social transformations were implemented even in very remote regions of the landmass, 
often in the most brutal ways. The milder forms of Western Europe were perhaps exem-
plified in Scandinavia. Yet Polanyi seems to have doubted that the latter could serve as 
a general model. Tinkering with capitalism through interventionist policies to regulate 
markets and ensure higher standards of welfare would not bring more than temporary 
relief. In the long run, the reformist policies of liberal democracies would only deepen 
the contradictions of capitalism. This diagnosis was to be confirmed with the rise of 
neoliberal ideology and the dissolution of the regulatory institutions of Bretton-Woods 
within a decade of Polanyi’s death.
Twentieth century socialism is not merely a reaction to uneven development in the era 
of industrial capitalism. It certainly is that, but at the same time it embodies a principle 
of transcendence whose roots must be traced to the universalist principles that received 
their first elaborate legitimation in the Axial Age. We can speculate on the ultimate 
origins of this principle. While cooperation and sharing are well documented in “tribal” 
societies, the agrarian empires of Eurasia (and also the Mongol empire analysed in this 
issue by Favereau) carried collective organization forward on a new scale. These polities 
are characterized by the violent extraction of resources and by extremes of economic 
exploitation, including slavery. But they are also marked by new solidarities and by the 
consolidation of systems of tribute and taxation that did not depend solely on coercion. 
This is where the approaches of the classical Axial Age theorists are invaluable. With-
out subscribing to notions of “moral revolution” and without denying the possibility of 
“transcendence” in non-literate societies, we must recognize new forms of social inclu-
sion and legitimation in the agrarian empires. The Chinese Emperor enjoys the Mandate 
of Heaven, but he also carries the burden of responsibilities for all of his people. For 
many centuries, charity on the part of religious and economic elites was more important 
than the actions of states with little or any fiscal capacity. But increasing differentiation 
and class inequality were accompanied by new forms of inclusion and belonging that 
31 See Gareth Dale, Karl Polanyi: A Life on the Left, New York 2016. See also Tim Rogan, The Moral Economists: R.H. 
Tawney, Karl Polanyi, E.P. Thompson, and the Critique of Capitalism, Princeton, NJ 2017.
Eurasian Dynamics: From Agrarian Axiality to the Connectivities of the Capitalocene | 25
found their ethical justification in the nexus where politics and religion came together. 
In the oasis of Qumul, as described by Bellér-Hann in this issue, officials, merchants and 
rulers alike were expected to be devout in their faith and generous in their support of the 
society’s weaker members. If “corporate social responsibility” is the euphemistic label for 
the compensatory activities of capitalist corporations, the dominant economic agents of 
the industrial era, the ethos of the agrarian empires in Eurasia, precursors of the secular 
ideals of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist socialism, might be described as one of imperial social 
responsibility.32 
A New Eurasian Age?
I noted that the interventions of Karl Jaspers in the late 1940s were a significant effort 
to move beyond teleological narratives that privilege one civilizational tradition. How 
do the prospects for a trans-Eurasian universal history look seventy years later? No con-
temporary political entities correspond exactly to the civilizations identified by Jaspers. 
China comes closest, but Jaspers would surely be disturbed by the way in which the Party 
ideologists have seized upon his notion of axiality in recent years, deploying it not in a 
universalist spirit but in Sinocentric terms to assert the antiquity of the Chinese.33
The present assertiveness and cultural nationalism of the Middle Kingdom (vividly dem-
onstrated by Jack Goldstone in his contribution to this issue) must be grasped against the 
background of a dominant “Western” constellation. Euro-American intellectuals have 
invested heavily in a world order they generally term liberal, which is built on “demo-
cratic politics” (implying a plurality of political parties), “human rights,” and, in the eco-
nomic domain, far-reaching scope for the principle of the “free market”. But what if the 
constellation surrounding the political economy of neoliberal globalization is not uni-
versal at all, just an ideology that masquerades as such? I have suggested in the preceding 
section that at the core of Eurasian history we need to recognize unprecedented notions 
of responsibility, solidarity and social citizenship. Marxist-Leninist-Maoist socialism ap-
pears retrospectively as an aberration, because its pseudo-universalism failed in reality to 
show sufficient respect for the individual human personality that first moved centre-stage 
32 Redistribution is put forward as a general if not universal analytic term by Polanyi. In this issue it is taken up most 
explicitly by Favereau for the case of the Mongols. Nonetheless, the consolidation of communitarian respon-
sibility on an unprecedented scale is primarily an innovation of the political societies which flourished across 
Eurasia in the wake of pioneering transformations in Mesopotamia and Egypt. This notion of responsibility is 
related to the notion of “prosocial behavior” in the model advanced by Mullins et al (“A systematic assessment”). 
However, the latter is misleading to the extent that it implies a general transformation of social action. In fact, 
the sphere of egotistical action associated with impersonal markets becomes more prominent at the same 
time. This is the micro-level tension that underpins the “great dialectic” between redistribution and the market 
at the macro-level of social evolution. See Chris Hann, The Anthropocene and Anthropology: Micro and Macro 
Perspectives, in: European Journal of Social Theory 20 (2017) 1: 183-96; Idem, Making Sense of Eurasia: Reflec-
tions on Max Weber and Jack Goody, in: New Literary History 48 (2017) 4: 685-99.
33 Hainer Roetz emphasized the paradoxical invocation of Axial Age theorizing in contemporary China at the 
Uppsala meeting. 
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in the philosophical texts of the third millennium BCE. Embryonic forms of mixed 
economy, representative politics and generalized provision for the weaker members of 
the community seem to be intrinsic characteristics of the polities that took shape in the 
Axial Age. The principles of Confucianism, nowadays revived in Xi Jinping Thought, 
and those of economist Milton Friedman, cited for contrast to Xi in the paper of Gold-
stone in this issue, mark the extremes of a spectrum that is common. There is a broad 
consensus across Eurasia today, from Brussels to Beijing, that markets are indispensable, 
but that it is no less essential to maintain the essentials of a welfare state that looks after 
all of its citizens, and takes seriously its responsibilities to the natural environment.
Of course, such concerns are not confined to Eurasia. But it is impossible to overlook the 
fact that, under its 45th President, the hegemonic state of the current era is pushing in the 
opposite direction. Donald Trump and the Republican Party claim to have an electoral 
mandate for policies that will reduce many citizens’ access to social insurance and pen-
sions.34 Meanwhile China, in spite of its authoritarianism and the fact that its GNP per 
capita remains greatly inferior, is steadily improving collective welfare provision in the 
direction pioneered in the last century by Western Eurasia. President Trump’s withdrawal 
from the Paris Accords of 2015, to which the rest of the world declares its adherence, is 
another sign that established geo-political and military affiliations are increasingly out 
of kilter with the socio-cultural preferences (values) of citizens. This President calls upon 
the states of Western Eurasia to which he is bound in a military alliance to increase their 
“defence” budgets to the level of his own, while pursuing economic and social policies 
that accentuate the inequalities that the great majority of European citizens deplore. Has 
his policy of “America first” disturbed the links between the United States and Eurasia 
fundamentally? Together with the result of the Brexit referendum in Britain, is this not 
evidence that Polanyi’s dialectic between the market and redistribution has entered a new 
phase, demanding more radical solutions than the Keynesian compromises of Bretton-
Woods? Is it not high time to translate the commonalities of Eurasian “big history,” 
above all civic-imperial principles of responsible inclusion, into a contemporary com-
mon cause against the follies emanating from the White House? 
In the first decades of the twenty-first century, some scholars are seeking to move politi-
cal debate to a new level. It is argued across a range of disciplines that humanity has 
already had such a far-reading “geological” impact on the earth that we have entered 
a new age, that of the Anthropocene. By contrast, Jason W. Moore has popularized 
34 Hans Joas has objected (at the seminar in Uppsala, see note 1) that I paint an unwarranted contrast between the 
USA and Eurasia. He is surely right to point out that the USA owes a great deal to European religious and political 
systems, and that this country had made substantial contributions to what I am characterizing as a Eurasian 
dialectic (notably in promoting ideals of individual freedom and human rights). Many citizens of the USA share 
the pro-welfare state preferences to those of Eurasian citizens – and others around the world. But I think it is 
more than a matter of a perverse electoral system that prevents these predilections from being implemented. 
Frontier conditions and slavery created a variety of capitalism in North America that, despite its Protestant roots, 
could not lead to the kind of morally embedded redistributive economies that have evolved in Europe, which I 
see as closer to societal aspirations throughout Eurasia. 
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the concept of Capitalocene.35 For this US sociologist cum political ecologist, it is the 
capitalist mode of production which is responsible for the irresponsible devastation of 
so much of our fragile planet in recent centuries. Moore begins his narrative with mer-
cantile capitalism in the fifteenth century. Like so many others, including the majority 
of neo-Marxist thinkers (including Wallerstein), he thus remains fundamentally within 
the familiar Europeanist paradigm. But this is inadequate in at least two ways. E. A. 
Wrigley has demonstrated that the most important caesura in world history takes place 
later than suggested in the standard Europeanist narratives, namely in the eighteenth 
century, when an “energy revolution” based on the exploitation of fossil fuels enables 
the transcendence of “organic” economy.36 Secondly, and this is the main argument of 
this essay, the Europeanist narrative misses the earlier transformations that were indis-
pensable for all that has happened on Earth in the last half-millennium. Goody shows 
us that the social relations of the capitalist mode of production must be traced back to 
the urban revolution of Bronze Age Eurasia. Polanyi offers tools to analyse the dialectic 
of global history that began in this era, and to evaluate this dialectic. The label Anthro-
pocene implies that humanity everywhere bears responsibility for the predicament of the 
planet today. This is grossly unfair to the vast majority of humanity, above all indigenous 
peoples all over the world. From this angle, the concept of Capitalocene has its attrac-
tions. But the very notions of capitalism and modernity are saturated with Eurocentric 
bias, and for this reason Moore’s term is misleading. The present era in the history of our 
planet might be more accurately identified as the Eurasiacene. It originated with specific 
human populations and technologies in Eurasia. These have long spread to embrace the 
entire world, but the states of Eurasia constitute the best hope we have of finding solu-
tions; this is a universal responsibility. 
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35 Jason W. Moore, Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital, London 2015. See also 
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